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Casenote

Barras v. BB&T: Charting a Clear Path to
Apply Concepcion Through a Quagmire of
Divergent Approaches

I.

INTRODUCTION

A recent series of Supreme Court opinions, climaxing in the landmark
case AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,' has undermined the validity
of applying unconscionability to arbitration agreements and generated
2
divergent opinions in lower courts. The saving clause of the Federal
Arbitration Act of 1927, 9 U.S.C. § 2' (FAA saving clause), states that
"an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration ... shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist ... for the
5
revocation of any contract." Until Concepcion, unconscionability was

1. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011).
2. Thomas J. Stipanowicb, The ThirdArbitrationTrilogy: Stolt-Nielsen,Rent-a-Center,
Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 323, 337-38,
364-65, 375-76 (2012).
3. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
4. Id.
5. Unconscionability is an affirmative defense to a contract claim requiring the claimant
to prove there is such a degree of both substantive and procedural unfairness that a
reasonable person would neither make nor accept the bargain. See Coneffv. AT&T Corp.,
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an established ground for revoking arbitration agreements 6 under the
FAA saving clause.7 In Barras v. BB&T,5 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit limited Concepcion for the first time in
the Eleventh Circuit.9 This Note will explain the facts of Barras,
Supreme Court precedent, the approach other circuits have taken in
dealing with cases like Barras,and the important differences between
these approaches and the Eleventh Circuit's approach. Because Barras's
implications appear when its reasoning is contrasted with other circuits,
this Note will conclude by using the differences and similarities in the
courts' reasoning to build a framework to interpret Concepcion more
consistently.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL POSTURE

In Barras, the Eleventh Circuit severed a cost-and-fee-shifting
provision from an arbitration agreement, holding that the state standard
rendering it unconscionable was not preempted by AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion's ° interpretation of the FAA." The plaintiff, Lacy
Barras, alleged that BB&T (1) charged her overdraft fees even when she
had sufficient funds; (2) supplied her inaccurate and misleading
information; and (3) failed to provide her proper notice before making
substantive changes to her account-all to wrongfully increase its
revenue. Barras litigated under state contract and fair dealing theories,
in particular, unconscionability. She litigated these claims in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida as a representative of a putative class of similarly situated plaintiffs. BB&T moved to
compel arbitration according to her customer agreement, binding under
the FAA. The district court denied the motion, holding the arbitration

673 F.3d 1155, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that most states evaluate both substantive
and procedural aspects in determining unconscionability); 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
§ 18:10 (4th ed.).
6. An arbitration agreement is a contractual provision where the parties agree to
settle, in a binding manner, their legal disputes out of court according to the applicable
substantive law governed by a neutral agreed-upon set of procedural rules, with the final
substantive and procedural decisions being made by an agreed upon person or groups of
persons. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (9th ed. 2009).
7. Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 323, 337, 364-65, 375-76.
8. In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig. MDL No. 2036 (Barras v. BB&T), 685 F.3d
1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2012). Barrasis one of many opinions rendered in consolidated multidistrict litigation regarding bank overdrafts consolidated under the title: In re Checking
Account Overdraft Litig. MDL No. 2036.
9. 685 F.3d 1269, 1275-76, 1279, 1282-83.
10. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
11. Id. at 1275-76, 1279, 1282-83.
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agreement unconscionable and unenforceable under the FAA saving
clause, and BB&T appealed.'" While the appeal was pending, the
Supreme Court decided Concepcion." In light of Concepcion, the
14
Eleventh Circuit remanded Barras to the district court. The district
court reaffirmed its earlier ruling, holding that South Carolina's
unconscionability standard was unpreempted by the FAA. BB&T again
appealed.' 5
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that the FAA did not
preempt South Carolina's unconscionability standard because shifting all
costs and fees arising from any dispute to one party (the customer)
6
would interfere with the neutrality of bilateral arbitration. While the
cost-and-fee-shifting provision was not in the arbitration agreement, the
court of appeals held the provision applied to any costs or attorney fees
incurred in arbitration. 7 The court reversed the lower court's severance
decision and held that the cost-and-fee-shifting provision alone, rather
than the entire arbitration agreement, should be severed.'" This left the9
arbitration agreement-including the class arbitration waiver-intact.
While this result gutted the value of Barras's victory, whose apparent
goal was to litigate as a class representative,2 ° the holding remains
important to understanding the riddle left by Concepcion.
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Legal Canvas: Supreme Court Precedent
"The 'principal purpose' of the FAA is to 'ensur[e] that private
21
Before
arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.'

A.

12. Id. at 1273-74.
13. In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig. (Powell-Perry v. BB&T), 425 F. App'x 826,
827 (11th Cir. 2011).
14. Id.
15. Barras,685 F.3d at 1273-74.
16. Id. at 1282 ("Moreover, the cost-and-fee shifting provision distorts the fairness and
reliabilityof the arbitrationproceedingby forcing Barras to fund any loss, cost, or expense
incurred by BB&T in arbitration ....These provisions of the unconditionalcost-and-feeshifting provision are not 'geared towards achieving an unbiased decision by a neutral
decision-maker."') (quoting Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 644 S.E.2d 663, 668
(2007)) (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 1276.
18. Id. at 1283-84.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1273.
21. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (alteration in
original) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
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the passage of the FAA, state courts were notoriously anti-arbitration, 2
because it seemingly acted as an exculpatory provision that stripped
plaintiffs of any meaningful remedy for their substantive rights." In
response to this judicial hostility, Congress passed the FAA.' Because
the FAA made arbitration agreements binding, it injected a tension
between state judiciaries and the federal legislature, leaving the federal
judiciary stuck in the middle.' This tension resulted in three trilogies
of Supreme Court opinions punctuated at twenty-five year intervals.26
The first trilogy established a federal policy that favored arbitration over
competing federal policies implied in federal statutes. The second
trilogy established that the FAA's federal policy favoring arbitration
would override competing policies established by the state courts or
legislatures."
The third trilogy, decided in the last three years,

22. Volt Info. Scis., Inc., 489 U.S. at 478 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470
U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985)).
23. Stephen Friedman, ArbitrationProvisions:Little Darlingsand Little Monsters, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 2035, 2038 (2011) [hereinafter Friedman, ArbitrationProvisions].
24. Id. at 2038.
25. David Horton, UnconscionabilityWars, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 387,391-92 (2012). The
FAA's implication and application in light of the "Erie" problem (the problem of whether
federal or state law applies when a federal court hears a case based on diversity subject
matter jurisdiction) raises some fascinating issues of federalism, which are outside the
scope of this Note. See Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The
FederalizationofArbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1378 (1985).
26. Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 324-25.
27. The three "steelworkers" cases were decided in 1960. United Steelworkers v. Am.
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior& Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
Unions attempted to remove the sting of the arbitration agreements contained in their
collective bargaining contracts-binding under the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947 (the Labor Act)-by challenging the judicial enforcement of arbitral judgments based
on the underlying merits of their cases. Michael H. LeRoy, IrreconcilableDeferences? The
Troubled Marriage of JudicialReview StandardsUnder the Steelworkers Trilogy and the
Federal Arbitration Act, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 98 (2010). The Court upheld the
enforcement of arbitrator's judgments. Id. The Court reasoned that arbitrators and the
arbitration mechanism were integral to the goal of Congress in the Labor Act, stating:
"[The Labor Act's] policy can be effectuated only if [the contract's arbitration agreement
binding under the FAA] is given full play." United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 566.
28. The second trilogy of cases, in 1984 and 1985, worked out the implications of the
Court's earlier decision to extend the definition of "commerce" in the FAA to the extent of
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Horton
supra note 25, at 399 (noting that the FAA was passed under the more limited commerce
power jurisprudence of the 1920s); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395, 401 (1967); Hirshman, supra note 25, at 1305. The Court bypassed three limits on
arbitration. First, in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., the
Court held that when the question of the arbitrability of a dispute is subject to parallel
actions in both federal and state court, the federal court could not defer to the state forum,
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brought the underlying tension between unconscionability and arbitration to a climax.
The third trilogy consists of Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp.;2 s Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson;30 and
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.3 In Stolt-Neilson, the Court held
that the FAA preempted the use of public policy when constructing
parties' intent from a contract that is silent on the issue of class
arbitration.3 2 This indirectly "laid the siege lines" on "the breastworks
of unconscionability" by displacing public policy considerations in
contract interpretation with a FAA policy of strictly enforcing arbitration
agreements.33
The Court's opinion in Rent-a-Center was more direct. In Rent-aCenter, the Court ruled that when contractual parties agree to arbitrate
all disputes, the court must limit the scope of an unconscionability
analysis to only the provisions in the agreement to arbitrate (gateway
provisions).' Thus, when a gateway provision provides all disputes are
subject to arbitration, the court may not determine unconscionability by
looking at any other unfairness in the contract. 35 Limiting the courts'
consideration to gateway provisions left very little room to examine the
fairness of the corpus of the deal-in other words--substantive
unconscionability.3"

absent exceptional circumstances, because "Congress's clear intent, in the [FAA], [is] to
move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and
easily as possible." 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983). Second, in Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Court
held that the FAA preempted a California state statute that mandated a judicial (nonarbitral) forum because "Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to
undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements." 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). Third, in
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, the Court held that no court, whether federal or state,
could allow a plaintiff to litigate arbitrable claims on the ground that the claims
"intertwined" with arbitrable claims to a degree that separating the claims would be
inefficient. 470 U.S. at 216-17. The Court supported its holding on the ground that FAA
policy "requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is
'piecemeal' litigation." Id. at 221. The common thread of these cases was a broad, simple
rule favoring arbitration to the detriment of state policies. Hirshman, supra note 25, at
1378. See also Friedman, Arbitration Provisions, supra note 23, at 2044; Stephen E.
Friedman, A Pro-CongressApproach to Arbitrationand Unconscionability, 106 Nw. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 53, 57 (2011) [hereinafter Friedman, A Pro-CongressApproach].
29. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
30.
31.

130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).

32.
33.
34.

130 S. Ct. at 1766, 1776.
Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 337.
130 S.Ct. at 2779.

35.

Id.

36. Horton, supra note 25, at 396.
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The Court's decision in Concepcion "dramatically diminished" the use
of unconscionability as a meaningful method of avoiding arbitration. '
In Concepcion, the plaintiffs attempted to file a class-action lawsuit
against AT&T alleging that AT&T engaged in false and deceptive
advertising that cost the plaintiffs (and others similarly situated) about
$30. The district court refused AT&T's motion to enforce arbitration
because it found that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable
under California's "DiscoverBank" rule. The Discover Bank rule held
class arbitration waivers unconscionable if (1) the contract was one of
adhesion, (2) damages from disputes would normally be small, and (3)
the more powerful party intended to cheat individual customers through
many small wrongs.3 8 The rule rested on the premise that enforcing a
class arbitration waiver in such a contract would practically exculpate
the wrongdoer from obtaining legal redress.39 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.4' The Supreme Court
reversed, ruling that the FAA preempted the DiscoverBank unconscionability rule.4 '
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion for the Court. 42 The Court held
that California's Discover Bank rule did not provide grounds for
revocation of the arbitration agreement according to the FAA saving
clause.43 Justice Scalia supported this ruling by stating that the effect,
if not purpose, of the Discover Bank rule is the impedance of bilateral
arbitration." He further reasoned that the FAA's purpose is to give
contracting parties freedom to decide disputes in an efficient and
streamlined manner.45 Therefore, if the parties decide that the most
efficient method to decide their disputes is bilateral arbitration, the
Court should enforce this method even if it requires the preemption of
all state policies.46
The factual basis of Concepcion's holding involved AT&T's uniquely
consumer-friendly arbitration agreement.4" The agreement provided
that for small claims, defined as $10,000 or less: AT&T could not
recover attorney fees; and should the customer be awarded with an

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 380.
131 S. Ct. at 1745-46.
Id. at 1746.
Id. at 1745.
Id. at 1750-51, 1753.
Id. at 1744.
Id. at 1748.
Id. at 1747.
Id. at 1751.
Id.
Id. at 1745.
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amount greater than AT&T's last settlement offer, AT&T must pay a
minimum of $7,500 and twice the amount of the plaintiff's attorney
fees.48 These facts made it easier to dismiss the plaintiff's policy
argument that class arbitration waivers would exculpate guilty parties
by removing any feasible method of the customer to vindicate their
substantive rights.49 However, foreseeing this factual distinction,
Justice Scalia emphasized that the purpose of the FAA is to enforce
arbitration agreements as written-despite all state public policy.50
Justice Thomas concurred, employing a plain language argument of
FAA interpretation. Justice Thomas pointed out that the FAA states
arbitration provisions shall be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable"
unless there are grounds for "revocation."' Justice Thomas interpreted
this to mean that state rules holding a contract invalid or unenforceable
are different from state rules holding the contract revocable."2 Justice
Thomas applied this theory by distinguishing between traditional
formation defenses, such as duress, fraud, and failure of consideration,
which prevent the existence of mutual assent or otherwise strike at the
existence of a contract 53-and unconscionability, which does not deny
the existence of a contract but rather refuses to enforce it as a matter of
policy.54
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and
Justice Kagan, dissented. 5 Justice Breyer focused on the fact that
California's unconscionability rule would have applied to class action
waivers outside of the arbitration context with equal force.5" Because
the DiscoverBank rule did not facially disfavor arbitration, it should fall
within the FAA saving clause's requirement that grounds for revocation
apply equally to any contract.5 7 Justice Breyer then explained how class
arbitration furthered the efficient resolution of claims. 58

48. Id. at 1744.
49. Id. at 1753 (noting that "the Concepcions were better off under their arbitration
agreement with AT&T than they would have been as participants in a class action").

50. Id. at 1749.
51. Id. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Significantly, the statute does not parallel the
words 'valid, irrevocable, and enforceable' by referencing the grounds as exist for the
'invalidation, revocation, or nonenforcement' of any contract.").

52. Id.
53. Friedman, ArbitrationProvisions,supra note 23, at 2062.
8 WILLISTON ON CoNTRAcTs § 18:10.
55. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1756 (Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, JJ.,
dissenting).
54.

56. Id. at 1757.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1761-62.
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Because Concepcion distinctly stated that the federal policy favoring
arbitration would necessarily preempt any state policy argument that
would limit bilateral arbitration,5 9 some thought that the result might
be different if the limiting policy stemmed from federal law.60 The
Court expressly declined to give credence to this argument in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood.6 In CompuCredit, the Court 2 rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the federal policies undergirding the Credit
Repair Organization Act63 provided a countervailing policy sufficient to
avoid the arbitration agreement's class-action waiver, requiring an
express Congressional statement before overriding the FAA.S
B.

Other Circuit Courts Post-Concepcion

Concepcion's narrow factual holding created a broad spectrum of
interpretations. The following four general approaches have obtained
credence in the lower courts: (1) Concepcion represents a narrow
exception that preempts state standards based on the policy that
plaintiffs ought to have incentives to litigate; (2) arbitration provisions
can never be grounds for substantive unconscionability unless the
provision would inhibit bilateral arbitration; (3) arbitration provisions
are never substantively unconscionable, requiring extreme procedural
unconscionability; and (4) all unconscionability of arbitration is
preempted.
1. Courts that Treat Concepcion as a Narrow Exception. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit6 5 adopted the

59. Id. at 1749.
60. Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd and
remanded, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012).
61. 132 S. Ct. 665, 673 (2012).

62. Note that the majority opinion was authored by Justice Scalia. Id. at 667.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1679 (2006).
64. CompuCreditCorp., 132 S. Ct. at 672-73.
65. The Tenth Circuit appears to have followed this approach as well. See Daugherty
v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., 2011 WL 2791338 (D. Colo. 2011) (noting that an even-

handed state unconscionability law would survive preemption, but only finding two
provisions unconscionable because certain factors were removed from the analysis by

Concepcion). However, this court has not been as quick as the Second Circuit to distinguish
Concepcion-perhaps because plaintiffs have failed to make a strong procedural
unconscionability argument. See Vernon v. Qwest Commc'ns Intl, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d

1135, 1157-58 (D. Colo. 2012) (finding the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence to support
unconscionability but especially focusing on a failure to meet the procedural test); accord
THI of New Mexico at Vida Encantada, LLC v. Lovato, 848 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1324 (D.
N.M. 2012), Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Rising Sun Missionary Baptist Church, Inc.,
2012 WL 1801955 (D. Colo. 2012), White v. Four B Corp., 2011 WL 4688843 (D. Kan. 2011).
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first approach in In re American Express Merchant's Litigation (Amex
III),66 creating two limits on Concepcion.6 Amex III held that a class
arbitration waiver was not binding on a group of small supermarkets
that had contracted with American Express because the waiver was
6
unconscionable under a state standard not preempted by the FAA. "
The concurring and dissenting opinions rendered in the court's denial of
the supermarkets' request for en banc review display the competing
arguments. Judge Pooler, who authored the majority opinion in Amex
7
III,9 rendered the only opinion supporting the denial of rehearing, "
while Chief Judge Jacobs dissented.7 ' Judge Pooler rested her argu111.72
ment on the reasons she had given in Amex
First, Judge Pooler distinguished Concepcion on the ground that here
the plaintiff's claims were federal, specifically, antitrust violation of the
74
Clayton Act, 73 while Concepcion involved state claims only. Second,
Judge Pooler contended that the class-action waiver in question would
remove the plaintiff's ability to obtain redress while Concepcion only
addressed the concern that a waiver would remove the plaintiff's
incentive to obtain redress. 75 Judge Pooler reached this conclusion by
reasoning that the cost and fee reimbursement provided to prevailing

66. 667 F.3d 204, 214 (2d Cir. 2012).
67. Id. at 214.
What Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion do not do is require that all class-action
waivers be deemed per se enforceable. That leaves open the question presented on
this appeal: whether a mandatory class action waiver clause is enforceable even
if the plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that the practical effect of enforcement
would be to preclude their ability to bring federal antitrust claims. While we
cannot rely on Concepcion or Stolt-Nielsen to answer the question before us, we
continue to find useful guidance in other Supreme Court decisions addressing the
issue of vindicating federal statutory rights via arbitration. We begin our analysis
with the well-settled rule that class action lawsuits are suitable as a vehicle for
vindicating statutory rights. Supreme Court precedent recognizes that the class
action device is the only economically rational alternative when a large group of
individuals or entities has suffered an alleged wrong, but the damages due to any
single individual or entity are too small to justify bringing an individual action.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
68. Id. at 218-19.
69. Id. at 206.
70. In re Am. Exp. Merchants' Litig., 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012) [hereinafterAmex III
denial of en bane rehearing].
71. Id. at 142.
72. Amex II, 667 F.3d at 219 ("We rely ... on the need for plaintiffs to have the
opportunity to vindicate their statutory rights.").
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2006).
74. Amex III denial of en bane rehearing,681 F.3d at 140.
75. Id. at 141 ("The Ninth Circuit expressly recognized the difference between incentive
and ability.").
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parties under the Clayton Act would not fully reimburse plaintiffs for
fees paid to expert antitrust witnesses, which would be required to
maintain a successful action.76
Chief Judge Jacobs addressed both contentions by looking at the
Clayton Act. He reasoned that because the Clayton Act expressly
provided for a limited reimbursement of costs, attorney fees, and expert
testimony fees, Congress had already decided what would be necessary
for plaintiffs to vindicate their rights." Thus, if Congress clearly
limited the proper level of concern for the vindication of plaintiff's rights
to the statute, the court should not infer from a federal statute
additional requirements that negate the FAA.78 If the statute does not
provide the source of this policy, then no reason remains to distinguish
between federal and state causes of action.79
2. Courts that Adopt the Bilateral Arbitration Limitation. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has adopted the
second approach,' that unconscionability of arbitration agreements is
preempted unless the provision interferes with bilateral arbitration. In
Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSystem Philadelphia,Inc.,8' the Third Circuit
held that a state standard rendering class-action waivers substantively
76. Id. at 141-42.
77. Id. at 144 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) ("Congress deems [the Clayton Act's] incentives
sufficient to encourage private suits.").
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. It appears that the Eighth Circuit court adopted a slight variant of this test in
Green v. Supershuttle International,Inc., the Eighth Circuit's leading case dealing with
Concepcion. 653 F.3d 766 (8th Cir. 2011). The court stated that the plaintiff's state-lawbased challenge to a class arbitration waiver in a consumer contract "suffers from the same
flaw as the state-law-based challenge as Concepcion-it is preempted by the FAA." Id, at
769. See also Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013) (relying on "more
than two decades of pro-arbitration Supreme Court precedent" in holding that a classarbitration waiver in an employment contract should be enforced according to its terms
unless Congress clearly mandated the contrary).
Additionally, it appears that the Fifth Circuit has adopted this standard. See Reed v.
Florida Metro. Univ., Inc., 681 F.3d 630, 646 (5th Cir. 2012) ("[Concepcion requires that]
arbitrators should not find implied agreements to submit to class arbitration, and courts
should not confirm arbitral awards that order parties into such a proceeding, without a
contractual or legal basis for doing so."). It is likely that the First Circuit will adopt it also.
See Karp v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 2012 WL 1358652, at *11 (D. Mass. 2012)
("Accordingly, enforcing the arbitration clause and compelling bilateral arbitration of
plaintiffs discrimination claims would not prevent her from vindicating her statutory
rights under Title VII. Plaintiff will therefore be required to submit her claim to arbitration
in accordance with this decision."). Therefore, this approach has garnered support from four
circuits.
81. 673 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2012).
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unconscionable was preempted because it "[sought] to impose class
arbitration despite a contractual agreement for individualized arbitration."8" Thus the arbitral forum must be bilateral, as the court similarly
stated in Litman v. Celico Partnership:' Concepcion is "broad and
clear: a state law that seeks to impose class arbitration despite [a class
arbitration waiver is] ...

preempted by[

the FAA, irrespective of

whether class arbitration is 'desirable for unrelated reasons."'" The
Third Circuit has recognized that some provisions might "preventI]
[plaintiffs] from vindicating [their] rights" in a bilateral forum." The
court indicated in dictum that a cost-and-fee-shifting agreement might
prevent plaintiffs from vindicating their rights if the plaintiffs can show
86
with reasonable certainty (1) their costs and (2) their inability to pay.
3. Courts that Preempt Substantive but not Procedural
Unconscionability. The Ninth Circuit, which is of unique interest
because it was the court Concepcion reversed, has adopted the third
approachT--emphasizing the need for extreme procedural unconscionability. In Coneff v. AT&T Corp.,' the Ninth Circuit's broad rule
preempting substantive unconscionability tracks the language of the
majority opinion in Concepcion.8 9 The court stated that "the FAA
preempts the [state unconscionability rule] invalidating the class-action
waiver," but "gives little guidance [for procedural unconscionability]
beyond a recognition of the doctrine's continued vitality."9'
The Ninth Circuit solidified its stance in Kilgore v. KeyBank National
Ass'n,9 2 expanding Concepcion's preemption of substantive unconscionability outside of the class-action context. 93 In Kilgore, the court held

82. Id. at 233.
83. 655 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2011).
84. Id. at 231 (citations omitted).
85. Antkowiak v. TaxMasters, 455 F. App'x 156, 160 (3d Cir. 2011).
86. Id. at 160-61.
87. The Seventh Circuit appears to follow the Ninth Circuit. See Gore v. Alltel
Commc'ns, LLC, 666 F.3d 1027, 1036 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that it was for the arbitrator
to decide whether the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable).
88. 673 F.3d 1155, 1155 (9th Cir. 2012).
89. Id. at 1160 (stating that the majority in Concepcion, in addressing the dissent,
specifically foresaw how its narrow facts could be distinguished and accordingly made the
Court's desire for a broad interpretation clear).
90. Id. at 1161.
91. Id.
92. 673 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2012).
93. Id. at 961 (noting that Concepcion did not address the issue of public injunctions
but does stand for the proposition that state policy based on the substance of the
arbitration provision is always preempted by the contrary policy of the FAA).
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that the FAA preempted California's common-law unconscionability
doctrine that refused to enforce arbitration on claims that require public
injunctive relief.14 The court noted that it was "not free to ignore
Concepcion's holding that state public policy cannot trump the FAA
when that policy prohibits the arbitration of a 'particular type of
claim.'" 95 However, the court examined the strength of the plaintiff's
claim for procedural unconscionability at length.96
4. The Court that Might Eliminate Unconscionability as a
Limit to Arbitration. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit has not expressly addressed the specific issue of unconscionability after the Supreme Court's ruling in Concepcion9 7 However, a
brief survey of its district court opinions indicates that the Sixth Circuit
might adopt Justice Thomas's suggestion and simply remove unconscionability as a ground for revoking arbitration agreements. 98

94. Id. at 963.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 963-64. However, it appears that Concepcion has affected the definition of
procedural unconscionability, as the court noted mere adhesion will be insufficient if
unaccompanied by other factors such as finding the parties were unsophisticated, or lacked
sufficient time to read the contract, or the language was inconspicuous.
97. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 2012 WL 604305, at *13 (S.D. Ohio 2012)
("Similarly, this Court concludes that classwide arbitration, to the extent manufactured by
a rule of contract construction that would render arbitration agreements unconscionable
contracts of adhesion if interpreted not to permit class arbitration, would be inconsistent
with the FAA."); Porter v. MC Equities, LLC, 2012 WL 3778973, at *5 (N.D. Ohio 2012)
("In Concepcion, the Supreme Court ruled that arbitration agreements must be enforced
and that an agreement to disallow class procedures in an arbitration agreement was not
a defense to enforcement."); SL Tennessee, LLC v. Ochiai Georgia, LLC, 2011 WL 7154486,
at *7 (E.D. Tenn. 2011), affd, 2012 WL 381338 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) ("IT]he Court finds that
all claims before the Court should be subjected to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration
clause contained in the parties' contract.").
98. See Marshall v. ITT Technical Inst., 2012 WL 1565453, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. 2012).
Plaintiff also argues that the arbitration clauses are unconscionable and should
not be enforced because the clauses substantially limit his rights. This argument,
however, conflicts with the federal policy favoring arbitration and the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court and Tennessee courts applying the FAA....
Accordingly, plaintiffs argument that the arbitration clauses are unconscionable
and unenforceable is not well-taken.
Id. On the other hand, the district court opinions in the Fourth Circuit evidence no
discernible trend. Compare Rose v. New Day Fin., LLC, 816 F. Supp. 2d 245, 259 (D.Md.
2011) ("That an agreement restricts a party's access to a court does not make it unfair; the
arbitration is not inferior to the courtroom."), with AT&T Mobility LLC v. Fisher, 2011 WL
5169349, at *6 (D.Md. 2011) ("[Concepcion] held that the FAA preempts a state court rule
conditioning the enforceability of an arbitration agreement on the availability of classwide
arbitration procedures. It did not squarely hold that such waivers can never violate public
policy or, conversely, that they are always valid.").
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C. Eleventh CircuitPost-ConcepcionPrecedent
sa
In Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, the Eleventh Circuit began the
task of applying Concepcion's ruling. Cruz presented a factual scenario
almost identical to Concepcion-a cell phone consumer °0using unconscioHowever, the
nability to challenge a class arbitration waiver.
contract, if the
their
under
(1)
plaintiffs raised two distinguishing points:
court must
the
then
class arbitration waiver was held unconscionable
(2) they
and
clause);
blow-up
strike the entire arbitration agreement (a
make
would
waiver
had admissible evidence that a class-action
vindication of their rights impractical.''
The court summarily dismissed the plaintiffs' blow-up clause
argument, noting that it simply evidenced the other party's desire to
litigate rather than arbitrate a class action, reinforcing the Court's
°2
reasoning in Concepcion.' The second argument, factual substantia0 3
tion, required a more lengthy analysis." The plaintiffs provided
affidavits from several attorneys stating that the small claims would be
that "only
cost-prohibitive to pursue, substantiating this by showing
04
The court
complaint.
a
0.000007%" of the customers actually filed
merely
had
plaintiffs
the
rejected this argument, again reasoning that
10 5
The
Concepcion.
in
substantiated arguments specifically rejected
of
enforcement
strict
court further stated that Concepcion would require
from
litigant
the
a class arbitration waiver even if it precluded
0 6
vindicating a state substantive right. The court concluded by citing
no longer a viable
Justice Thomas's opinion that unconscionability 0 is
7
agreement.
arbitration
an
method of challenging
In Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,' the court reaffirmed Cruz v.
09
CingularWireless, LLC. 1 The court held that the plaintiff's uncontroverted evidence that the class-arbitration waiver would 0render him
unable to vindicate his substantive rights was irrelevant." The court
stated "The Supreme Court ... expressly rejected the notion that the

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

648 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1208.
Id. at 1213.
Id.
Id. at 1213-14.
Id. at 1214.
Id.
Id. at 1214-15.
Id. at 1215.
691 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2012).
648 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1235.
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state law should not be preempted because the class action waiver would
effectively shield the defendant from liability.""' This sweeping
language diminished the likelihood of successfully distinguishing
Concepcionon its facts. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly rejected the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's approach-fact
distinction-and implicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit's approach-procedural unconscionability." 2 It appeared that the court
was ready to hold all unconscionability of arbitration preempted by the
FAA.
IV.

LEGAL RFASONING

In Barras, after affirming the lower court's decision that the gateway
provision was properly before the court and noting that the cost-and-feeshifting agreement would apply to arbitration, the court turned to the
question of unconscionability."' The opinion began by noting the
Supreme Court's reasons for distinguishing class arbitration from
bilateral arbitration, emphasizing class arbitration's higher risk and
complexity."4 The court noted that the Supreme Court in AT&T
Mobility LLC v.Concepcion"' stated that unconscionability could fall
within the FAA saving clause-avoiding preemption."" The court then
provided a three-factor analysis based on Concepcion, inquiring whether:
(1) the provision objectively disfavors arbitration, (2) striking the
provision would greatly increase the risk to the defendant, and (3) the
provision stems from a subjective judicial prejudice against arbitra117
tion.

However, the court defined each factor in terms of bilateral arbitration." 8 In the first factor, the court defined "[laws] that disfavor[
arbitration" as any law that favors class arbitration over bilateral

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 685 F.3d at 1275-76.
114. Id. at 1276.
115. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
116. 648 F.3d at 1277.
Although Concepcion held that the state law at issue was preempted, it made
clear that there are instances wherein a state law may invalidate an arbitration

agreement without being preempted by the FAA. Indeed, the phrase "save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract" in § 2

must have meaning.
Id.; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
117. Barras,685 F.3d at 1278.

118. Id. at 1277-79.
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arbitration." 9 Similarly, the court defined "increas[ing] [the] risk[] to
defendants" as the possibility ofhigh-stakes class arbitration rather than
bilateral arbitration.1 2 ° Lastly, the court defined subjective judicial
hostility against arbitration by distinguishing South Carolina's rule,
which did not require class arbitration, from California's rule, which
required the availability of class action in most consumer agreements.'21 Thus, all of these factors focus on bilateral arbitration as the
FAA policy mandated by Concepcion.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Barrasis the Eleventh Circuit's "bookend" on the possible interpreta22
tions of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion; in other words, Barras
limits rather than extends the implications of Concepcion.It follows that
the plausible implications of Barraswere latent in Concepcion. Because
the most plausible of these implications have been addressed in the
23
foregoing survey of the circuit-level interpretations of Concepcion,
this implications section will not explore the possible general implications of Barras,but rather will attempt two specific goals. The first goal
is to determine how Barraslimited the implications of Concepcion in the
Eleventh Circuit. The second goal is to determine how Eleventh Circuit
practitioners and judges can use this limitation to frame a circuit-wide
standard in light of state policies, federal policies, and the language of
Concepcion.
A. How BarrasShapes the Eleventh Circuit'sFuture Interpretationof
Concepcion
Eleventh Circuit precedent indicates that some form of the bilateral
arbitration approach will be adopted. Because Cruz v. CingularWireless,
LLC' held that a factually supported argument of exculpation could
not distinguish Concepcion, the Eleventh Circuit does not follow the
25
Second Circuit's approach-strictly limiting Concepcion to its facts.'
On the other hand, because Barrasheld that a substantively unconscionable arbitration provision could be removed without violating the FAA,
it seems that the Eleventh Circuit has declined to adopt the Ninth
Circuit's view-eliminating substantive unconscionability from the FAA

119. Id. at 1277.
120. Id. at 1278.

121. Id. at 1278-79.
122.
123.
124.
125.

131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
See subsection III.B.
648 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2011).
Compare subsection III.B.1. with subsection

mI.C.
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analysis. 126 However, the court did emphasize that Barras's cost-andfee-shifting agreement was buried in small print in another portion of
the contract and, therefore, would not clearly reveal the provision's
import to a reasonable reader.'27 Thus, while making no mention of the
Ninth Circuit's procedural unconscionability exception, the court left that
door open. Lastly, because the Eleventh Circuit held an arbitration
provision unconscionable, it has not adopted Justice Thomas's theory
128
that all unconscionability law surrounding arbitration is preempted.
On the other hand, in Cruz and Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,129
the Eleventh Circuit held the FAA preempted any law that would
require class arbitration. 3 ° These holdings, coupled with the emphasis
on bilateral arbitration in Barras, strongly indicate that the Eleventh
Circuit has adopted some form of the Third Circuit's rule-substantive
unconscionability of arbitration provisions is preempted by the FAA
unless the provision would inhibit bilateral arbitration. This rule fits
well with the facts from Barras, as the agreement shifting all of the
arbitration costs to the consumer would certainly inhibit bilateral
arbitration. The court points this out when it explains why the provision
was unconscionable under state law. The court stated that the cost-andfee-shifting provision would distort the arbitration proceeding to such a
degree that it would interfere with the unbiased, neutral nature
presumed in bilateral arbitration.'3 ' Thus, it appears that the Eleventh
Circuit will preempt unconscionability of an arbitration provision unless
the provision interferes with bilateral arbitration. 32
B. A Normative Analysis of How Legal Practitionersand Judges Can
133
Use Barras
1. The Narrow Exception Theory. The Eleventh Circuit should
not move toward the narrow exception theory, as that theory fails to

126. Compare section IV with subsection IH.B.3.
127. Barras,685 F.3d at 1280.
128. Id.

129. 691 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2012).
130. Id. at 1236; 648 F.3d at 1215.
131. Barras,685 F.3d at 1282.
132. Compare subsection II.A with section IV.
133. This section is a brief normative analysis of each of the four theories. I will limit
the treatment of each approach to the cases already addressed in this Note. I do this first,
because it is the only feasible manner to address the infinite number of scenarios that
could be hypothesized, and second, because I have provided a relatively comprehensive

coverage of the most important cases in their respective circuits and these will likely define
the legal arguments that will be made in the future.

-
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account for the sweeping nature of Concepcion's language. For example,
the Second Circuit distinguished between the Concepcion plaintiff-who
lacked sufficient incentive to vindicate a substantive right-and the
3
plaintiff in In re American Express Merchant's Litigation (Amex III)
-who lacked ability to vindicate a substantive right.' However, there
is no material difference between its definition of ability and the
Supreme Court's definition of incentive. In Amex III, the Second Circuit
defined "inability" as the factual allegation that a plaintiff's damages
would be consumed by requisite expert testimony fees unless spread
across multiple plaintiffs."' 6 In Concepcion, the Supreme Court defined
"incentive" as the factual allegation that the plaintiff's damages would
be consumed by requisite attorney fees unless spread across multiple
plaintiffs.'37 Though Amex III involved a federal statute, the Supreme
Court in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood"' foreclosed pitting implied
federal policy against FAA policy.'39 Thus, the Second Circuit's attempt
to limit Concepcion to its facts has failed to produce a satisfactory
explanation of Concepcion'sbroad language.
2. The Bilateral Arbitration Limit. The Third Circuit's approach
seems to fit most squarely with Concepcion's language. The Court clearly
did not intend to shut the door on all unconscionability. It mentioned
several times, with favor, that unconscionability could be grounds for

134.
135.

667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 214.

136. Id.
137. Compare Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1761 (Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor & Kagan
JJ., dissenting) ("What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions
in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?"), with id. at 1753
("The dissent claims that class proceedings are necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims
that might otherwise slip through the legal system .... But States cannot require a
procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.").
138. 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012).
139. Id. at 672-73. In Amex III, the court did attempt to distinguish CompuCredit in
a footnote. The court made what seems to be a semantic distinction that has no substantive
value. The court argued that CompuCreditdid not apply because there the plaintiff argued
that the federal statute provided a countervailing policy requiring some form of class
action, while here the plaintiff argued that the "class arbitration waiver would effectively
deprive them of their ability to vindicate their statutory rights." 667 F.3d at 213 n.5. The
Author is unsure exactly what the court understood to be the difference between the two,
but this looks like the semantic distinctions dealt with in the text accompanying notes 13538. It is also interesting that the Amex III judges cited Justice Sotomayor's concurrence
rather than the majority. Justice Sotomayor's CompuCredit concurrence is especially
interesting since Justice Sotomayor had originally been on the Amex 11Ipanel before being
elevated to the Supreme Court. See Amex IIl, 667 F.3d at 206 n.2.
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revocation under the FAA saving clause. 4 ° Courts examining these
statements almost uniformly agree that less than all unconscionability
of arbitration agreements is preempted."' When linked with the
Court's favorable description of bilateral arbitration and negative
portrayal of class arbitration, 142 it seems that bilateral arbitration is

what the Court in Concepcion intended to protect.
However, on closer inspection, several challenges to the bilateral
arbitration rule undermine its ability to save the doctrine of unconscionability. What is the source of this exception to FAA policy? If it is state
law (unconscionability), then it is preempted by the FAA's overarching
federal policy to enforce "arbitration agreements ... according to their
terms."43 If it is the proper interpretation of federal law (FAA policy)
then it is not state law, and thus no longer unconscionability,'" as
there is no federal unconscionability law.145 Thus, the bilateral arbitration rule does not truly save unconscionability. It fails to solve the riddle
presented by the Court's parallel claims that unconscionability is still
viable under the FAA saving clause 4" and state policy arguments are
preempted by the FAA. 147 Thus, bilateral arbitration is facially consistent with both the language and holding of Concepcion, but internally
inconsistent.
3. Procedural Unconscionability Alone. The "procedural
unconscionability alone" approach states that Concepcion preempted
substantive unconscionability but left procedural unconscionability
intact. This view, as the last, hangs on the Court's mention of unconscionability as grounds for revocation. 148 It removes the state policy
arguments that undergird substantive unconscionability, which appeals
to supporters of Justice Thomas's theory because a sufficient degree of
procedural unconscionability strikes at mutual assent, an element vital
149
to the formation of a contract.

140. E.g., Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746.
141. See subsections III.B. & Ill.C..
142. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751-52 (noting that class arbitration is slower, more
costly, more risky, and more formal than bilateral arbitration).
143. Id. at 1748 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 478).
144. Friedman, A Pro-CongressApproach, supra note 28, at 53-54.
145. Id. at 65.
146. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746.
147. Friedman, A Pro-CongressApproach, supra note 28, at 65.
148.

Kilgore v. Key Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 673 F.3d 947, 956 (9th Cir. 2012).

149. The Author notes that, at heart, the rules of contract formation are based on state
policy that does not differ from the doctrine of substantive unconscionability. A contract is
a promise that the state will enforce. Every state requires offer, acceptance, and
consideration (or a consideration substitute). Consideration is a prime example of states
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However, this approach ignores that unconscionability has historically
5°
required some degree of substantive unconscionability." It is hard,
almost impossible, to determine how state courts are going to be able to
develop unconscionability around procedural unconscionability alone
without consistently disfavoring certain types of provisions based on
5
their substance, especially consumer arbitration agreements.' ' Thus,
rather than providing answers, this doctrine might recreate problems
with Concepcion's bar against laws that implicitly disfavor arbitration.

making a policy/value judgment. A state could enforce promises without consideration. See
Nicole Kornet, Contractingin China: ComparativeObservations on Freedom of Contract,
Contract Formation,Battle of Forms and Standard Form Contracts, 14.1 ELEc. J. COMP.
L. (May 2010), availableat httpi/www.ejcl.org/141/artl4l-1.pdf. Thus, states have simply
made a value judgment that they do not want to enforce promises without consideration
(unless the failure of consideration can be amended by a substitute doctrine, such as
promissory estoppel, which at root expresses a state policy). Thus, there is no rigid logical
reason to distinguish between the procedural and substantive elements of unconscionability. This, however, does not derail the following analysis, since the FAA was drafted and
still exists in a context where the distinctions between formation and unenforceability have
legal meaning. See 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:10.
150. 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:10 (discussing Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
151. J.W. Looney & Anita K. Poole, Adhesion Contracts,Bad Faith,and Economically
Faulty Contracts, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 177, 184-85 (1999).
While the usefulness of the two-pronged analysis and the inconsistency in its
application have been criticized, courts have seemingly adopted this formulation
as a means of examining particular facts. Often the facts involve analysis of
unconscionability in the context of one of the specific provisions of the UCC where
it is addressed-for example, section 2-309 notice of termination or section 2-719
contractual limitation of remedy-but not always. In some significant cases, the
analysis focuses on overall enforceability under section 2-302, and, it must be
stressed, the same analysis is often used in non-UCC cases.
One of the most thorough analyses comes in Resource Management Co. v.
Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., where the defendants in an action for specific
performance unsuccessfully raised unconscionability by arguing that the
conveyance of certain oil and gas royalty rights by contract was unenforceable. The
court analyzed both substantive and procedural unconscionability and, specifically,
whether there must be a linkage between the two. On the one hand the court
stated, "[g] ross disparity in terms, absent evidence of procedural unconscionability,
can support a finding of unconscionability." On the other hand, the court
suggested that procedural unconscionability, alone, without "substantive
imbalance," would support a finding of unconscionability but "thatwould be rare."
In fact, the court correctly pointed out that in such cases other doctrines, such as
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, and mistake, are superior "tools" for analyzing
validity.
Id. (footnotes omitted).

610

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

4. Eliminating Unconscionability. The last approach, eliminating
unconscionability as grounds for revocation, has the intellectual appeal
of being internally consistent.152 However, this view is not consistent
with the language of Concepcion. Additionally, Justice Thomas's desire
for consistency might come at a great cost: 15 3 the destruction of any
meaningful limit on contractual freedom. 5 4 The elimination of unconscionability in arbitration agreements would naturally encourage
drafters to loop as many substantively hard provisions as possible into
the arbitration agreement, and it is difficult to imagine what procedural
provisions could not be integrated into an arbitration agreement. 55
While the federal courts could limit the definition of "arbitration" under
the FAA, this would result in a federal body of judicial precedent to
determine what agreements are enforceable. This result is akin to a
comprehensive standard preempting federal unconscionability.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In summary, no approach is able to solve the AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion1 6 riddle fully. However, a balance between the bilateral
arbitration exception and the procedural unconscionability rule has the
greatest merit. Such a combination provides a federal dictate of
substantive unconscionability, while leaving states to determine
procedural unconscionability. This seems to track the Court's concern to
protect bilateral arbitration without destroying state-based unconscionability standards. It also has the benefit of emphasizing procedural
unconscionability-a formation defense as required by Justice Thomas's
interpretation of the FAA. Barras laid the precedent for the Eleventh
Circuit to adopt such an approach; it is now the task of attorneys to
argue it successfully.
JACOB JOHNSON

152. Friedman, A Pro-CongressApproach, supra note 28, at 53.
153. Id. at 56.
154. Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access
to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704-05 (2012).
155. Cf Leslie Solondz, A Reasonable Alternative: Reaping the Benefits ofArbitration,
47 No. 3 DRI for Def. 60 (Mar. 2005), available at www.westlaw.com (discussing preConcepcion limitations on arbitration agreements created by unconscionability doctrines).
156. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).

